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Abstract

The Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) lost the supplier for its canopy
fracturing initiation system (CFIS) with no prospect for a replacement. This forced a
complete CFIS redesign to supply both an active production line and sustain fielded
aircraft. Compounding the problem, the existing CFIS became obsolete, which forced an
interim design to be produced until a final long term solution was fielded. This thesis
developed a method to optimize the redesign by determining the lowest cost path for both
fielding the interim design and phasing in the final retrofit. Using the Excel Solver®
modeling program, an optimal rate was found to expedite interim design introduction and
fleet changeover to the final design. The analysis concluded that using achievable stretch
goals, existing production capacity could be adjusted to field the final configuration at the
lowest cost.
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MITIGATING DIMINISHING MANUFACTURING SOURCES/MATERIAL
SHORTAGES (DMS/MS) AND OBSOLESCENCE FOR THE T-6 CANOPY
FRACTURING INITIATION SYSTEM (CFIS)
I. Introduction

1.0

Background
This thesis describes the methodology for developing and fielding a replacement

Canopy Fracturing Initiation System (CFIS) for the USAF/USN Joint Primary Aircraft
Training System (JPATS), depicted in Figure 1 (JPATS PMR, 2010), in a manner that
minimizes the cost of simultaneously maintaining the existing subsystem. JPATS is the
primary student pilot training aircraft for both services and consists of a single engine,
dual-seat turbo-prop aircraft shown in Figure 2 (JPATS PMR, 2010).
A generalized formula will be developed to model an optimal solution that
minimizes the cost of developing, fielding and procurement of an interim short-term
replacement subsystem needed to keep the JPATS fleet operational while expediting
development of a long term system level solution which will render the subsystem
obsolete immediately upon fielding.
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Figure 1. JPATS Canopy Fracturing Initiation System (CFIS) (JPATS PMR, 2010)

Figure 2. Joint Primary Aircraft Training System Air Vehicle Platforms
USAF T-6A (above) USN T-6B (below) (JPATS PMR, 2010)
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The reason this is so important to the US Government versus commercial suppliers
such as consumer electronics or auto manufacturers is the length of expected service life
of the average military system. (Builder, 1997:120) Military hardware undergoes
extensive and expensive qualification once developed and is typically updated/upgraded
throughout a longer useful life versus the planned obsolescence common in the
commercial sector. The item therefore needs to recover this higher development cost by
remaining in service as long as possible, which drives the concept of periodic upgrades
rather than complete replacement whenever possible to maximize the payback of the
investment. But just as incremental upgrades extend the useful life of systems, the longer
period of service also forces a need to manage operational costs; otherwise the overall
benefit of the item will be lost under the burden of sustainment. This requires in constant
monitoring of existing systems to ensure their reliability and maintainability are balanced
to avoid runaway costs. At times this requires leadership to move decisively when a
system’s cost of operation proves unacceptable, despite every effort to make it viable.
This can be painful, especially when huge costs were expended and a vested interest has
been established. But allowing an untenable situation to persist will ultimately result in
higher costs. The sooner a decision is made to change course and abandon a system, or
sub-system, when necessary, the quicker the situation will right itself.
The joint USAF/USN Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) currently
faces a serious risk of production line interruption in 2013 due to inadequate supplies of a
critical component that initiates the firing sequence in the canopy fracturing system,
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which allows the seat to safely clear the aircraft during an emergency ejection. The
existing Canopy Fracturing Initiation System uses a flash-bulb initiator and fiber optic
circuit to start the firing sequence and ignite detonation cord embedded in the canopy,
fracturing the canopy into pieces to allow unimpeded seat egress from the aircraft without
injury, during either ground evacuation or ejection seat deployment.
The current flash bulb initiator in the JPATS aircraft Figure 3 was designed in the
1990s and was based on a system using a fiber optic energy transfer line to initiate the
firing sequence. At the time, both JPATS and NASA (NASA, 2011) were considering
the use of this leading edge technology. Optical flash bulb technology was considered
the next technological leap and was expected to become the de facto standard based on its
simplicity and predicted reliability. Once fielded, however, the system did not meet life
cycle cost expectations for JPATS and NASA abandoned its plans to use a flash bulb
initiator. The space agency switched paths and subsequently chose another system,
leaving JPATS as the only crewed system operating with flash bulb technology. Mean
Time Between Failure (MTBF) of the system never met original predictions and shrank
steadily as JPATS fleet accumulated flight hours to the point where sustainability costs
became intolerable.

No other ejection seat equipped aircraft under development

considered an optical system for their fracturing initiation system (NAVAIR, 2010)
which meant the supplier had no incentive to make improvements in the system to satisfy
other demand for the product. In 2007, JPATS started an initial design effort to replace
the system which was expected to employ a fracturing method already deployed in other
aircraft systems.
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The JPATS CFIS is now an orphaned product (Builder, 1997:119), with no supplier
able to provide replacement flash bulbs for the original design. Unlike true obsolescence,
where the infrastructure no longer exists to allow use of an item, the current flash bulb
does perform its intended function.

The problem instead is one of Diminishing

Manufacturing Sources and Material Supply (DMS/MS) (National Research Council,
2011), since there is no way to replenish bulbs consumed.
Compounding the existing problem, current supplies of flash bulbs for the initiator are
limited and insufficient to meet demand based on the higher Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) that the JPATS fleet is experiencing. The bulb elements in the original design
employed a technology in common use throughout the consumer photography industry
during 1970-1980s.

The same flash bulbs were used in Kodak (Kodak, 2011)

flashcubes® and Magicubes® (Kodak, 2011) for traditional film “Instamatic” cameras
(Figure 4) and in flash bars used in instant photography (Figure 5). This technology is no
longer produced as a result of the shift from film photography to digital image
processing. The manufacturing community has not produced flash bulbs for over 14 years
and a study seeking to locate and restart bulb manufacturing was deemed impractical.
With supply no longer available and no vendors willing to attempt reviving production
capacity, an alternative must be found since the existing flash bulb stockpile for making
CFIS initiators will be exhausted by April 2013.
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Figure 3. Flashcube (Left) and Magicube (Right) for Kodak® Instamatic Cameras
Circa 1970-1980s (Kodak, 2011)

Figure 4. Flash bars used in instant photography (General Electric®)
(EBay, 2012)
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2.0

Problem Statement
Since there are other elements besides the flash bulbs in the existing CFIS

contributing to excessive maintenance costs, a permanent CFIS replacement must be
developed in parallel that will eventually eliminate the optical flash bulb design and use
instead a simpler, more robust system, preferably based on existing technology already in
service, to reduce life cycle costs to acceptable levels. Even if a complete CFIS redesign
is developed, that effort is not anticipated to be developed, qualified and deployed by
April 2013, so an interim solution must be found to sustain the JPATS fleet while the
long-term CFIS replacement design is eventually fielded. Options to procure or produce
the current flash bulbs must be considered and a make or buy cost-benefit analysis
performed to determine the optimal path. If there is no viable option to restart dormant
manufacturing capacity for the current flash bulb, then an alternate solution must be
found to avoid production stoppage when the stockpile of all available existing flash
bulbs is exhausted in April 2013.
Two simultaneous efforts are required to resolve the JPATS CFIS situation. First, a
substitute flash bulb must be designed, qualified and fielded as a drop-in form-fitfunction interim replacement. Second, a long-term solution must be started to fulfill the
life-cycle demands of CFIS across the JPATS fleet.
3.0

Research Objectives/Focus
The goal of this thesis is to determine what is the optimal strategy to 1) design,

develop, qualify and field an interim flash bulb while 2) simultaneously developing a
complete CFIS redesign that eliminates the flash bulb entirely 3) to avoid overspending

8

on production of the replacement flash bulb since that design will become obsolete
immediately upon fielding the redesigned CFIS system. The objectives will be the
identification of the solution(s) to consider minimizing the development cycle for both
the interim and replacement systems.
4.0

Investigative Question:

How should a DMS/MS optimality problem be structured and solved from a near, mid
and long-term perspective?
This answer to this question supports many program office decisions. Is it
economically feasible to restart the dormant manufacturing line to resume manufacturing
flash bulbs that have not been produced for 25-30 years? (Camerapedia, 2012) If
production is resumed, how much of the replacement bulb should be made as an interim
solution until a newly designed CFIS can be fielded? What is the optimal cost-benefit
break-even point between the substitute flash and the replacement CFIS development and
procurement cost?
5.0

Methodology
This research effort focuses on exploring tools, methods, and metrics for

evaluating and contrasting the source selection for a replacement flash bulb and the
criteria for ensuring a cost-effective, robust CFIS replacement design that provides
equivalent performance to the existing system while avoiding the high cost maintenance
drivers that made the current design uneconomical.
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The thesis will examine DMS/MS approaches through a literature search, and then
engage in discussions with technical experts to collect data. This data will be fed into a
constrained optimization problem and incorporate estimated design parameters to answer
the question of how to structure the most economical for both short and long term
solutions.
6.0

Assumptions/Limitations
Assumptions include a readily available technology, funding and technical

expertise to successfully develop, qualify and field the interim and long term CFIS
solution and that all current parties operating JPATS will pursue the same replacement
strategy to optimize cost sharing. An additional assumption is subject matter experts
have access to, and will share, realistic data. If not available, estimates will be used.
Since there has never been a design challenge of this magnitude facing the JPATS
program to date, there are several ground rules and assumptions that will be used to
mitigate the risk involved with retrofitting the current JPATS fleet of over 570 aircraft
which is expected to grow to 747 by the end of production in 2016 (GPO, 2009). Since
there are over 480 JPATS aircraft fielded with the current CFIS, including USAF, USN,
and foreign military operators, and an unknown scheduled cut-in for fielding the
replacement CFIS system, sufficient quantities of a qualified interim flash bulb must be
procured, including spares, to satisfy the demand of all current JPATS operators. The
goal is to only procure enough interim flash bulbs to cover retrofit and sustainment of the
CFIS until the replacement non-flash bulb technology is in place.
The challenge will be to not overproduce the interim design, since it will become
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obsolete once the replacement system is fielded and successfully passes operational test
and evaluation. And since the development, qualification and ramp up schedule for the
new system is still unknown, the challenge will be finding a conservative estimate for the
quantity of interim flash bulbs to bridge the introduction of the new CFIS and provide a
margin of safety to allow for unexpected startup delays.
The limitations are an inability to precisely predict the reliability and cost of
either the interim solution or the integration challenge of the legacy replacement system.
The break-even point for achieving cost savings over the current situation will contain
estimation errors.
7.0

Implications
The implication is that similar design dilemmas such as the JPATS CFIS have a

high probability of occurring with other crewed aircraft as their design useful lives are
reached. Numerous aircraft in the current Department of Defense inventory face
obsolescence challenges due to advances in technology and diminishing sources of
supply and material shortages (DMS/MS) (National Research Council, 2011) as suppliers
abandon support for product lines that no longer produce acceptable profit returns.
8.0

Preview
This thesis presents an analysis of how and why the JPATS CFIS was initially

selected, fielded and operated based on the acquisition strategy in place at the time of
contract award. The literature search will introduce similar optimization challenges from
other programs, describe how they were resolved and apply any lessons learned
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applicable to the JPATS CFIS. Further, interviews with technical experts will explain
how the unexpected added cost of operation of the current CFIS design grew so
burdensome as to force abandonment of the laser-based CFIS system in all manned flight
vehicles except for JPATS. The general optimization mathematical solution developed
provides a parametric framework for assessing what parameters and constraints are
needed to build a model to derive a solution and develop a confidence level for program
managers to assess the risks presented by alternative, specifically in optimizing return on
investment by not overspending on interim measure when a long-term solution is the
ultimate solution.
Finally, a specific solution will developed as a mathematical model as it pertains
to the current JPATS case, using estimates for design, procurement, retrofit and
sustainment which capture total cost of a developing and fielding an interim solution as
well as designing and qualifying a new replacement system.
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II.
2.0

Literature Review

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the concept of obsolescence as it

pertains to aerospace applications, review previously documented research for similarity
to this problem and, if relevant, examine how the solution was achieved; level of success,
observed shortcomings and further research conducted using the approach or a
modification.
2.1

Obsolescence & Diminishing Material Supply/Manufacturing Sources

2.1.1 Obsolescence
In the 32-year professional aerospace engineering experience of the author,
obsolescence (National Research Council, 2011) can also be defined as the inevitable loss
of usefulness of an item due to changes in its operating environment or introduction of
alternatives that better perform the intended purpose, based on the opinion of the user. It
occurs for various reasons, such as scientific advances, changes in consumer attitudes, or
regulatory mandates.
Table 1. Simple Examples of Obsolescence
Product

Present state

Improvement

Rationale

Software

Existing version

New Release

Speed, Features

Hardware

Ethernet Card

Wireless

Portability, Speed

Hardware

Analog

Digital (Transistor)

Software

Version matched to
OS hardware

Reliability, size,
cost

DEC PDP 11/44

Obsolescence
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The user is the critical factor in the definition of obsolescence. The mere fact that a new
means may arise to perform a function is not sufficient to cause obsolescence. Only the
inability to perform an existing function with available supplies will force an
obsolescence response. Unless there is an obvious advantage to voluntarily change,
users must perceive enough reason to abandon the sunk cost of their existing equipment
to pursue a better alternative. Whether it’s a lower cost, better performance or added
features, enough justification must exist, otherwise the current means to fulfill a need
remains satisfactory. This does not preclude the fact that users can be coerced to perceive
a benefit over the status quo. This is what marketing does in a capitalistic society to
boost sales of a new product. But the discussion of how a sales strategy can convince an
operator to change equipment sooner than is absolutely necessary is beyond the scope of
this thesis. See Figure 5 for a graphical representation of the obsolescence process.

Consumer

Obsolescence

Won’t Buy
Wants to Sell

Producer

Demands New Product

Finds new supplier

These two may resume their
business relationship until the
obsolescence cycle repeats
itself
Lacks ability to provide
new product

Adapts to new reality
or abandons market

Figure 5. Obsolescence Process
2.1.2

Diminishing Material Supply/Manufacturing Sources (DMS/MS)

2.1.2.1 Diminishing material supply
This occurs when either the raw material to produce an item is no longer readily
14

available to the product’s suppliers or the material has become so prohibitively expensive
that it is not cost effective to maintain it as a product ingredient in the item’s formulation.
(Builder, 1997:119) In the commercial world, this means the item cannot achieve a
reasonable profit margin. In the public sector, past pricing for similar items would
determine acceptability. DMS/MS is independent of product utility or the technology
behind its operation.

Many perfectly viable parts that meet or exceed user’s

expectations simply cannot be produced in their present configuration if the availability
of a key item in the manufacturing process is lost. See Figure 6 for a depiction of the
DMS/MS process and how adjustments are made to accommodate the user’s needs by
finding either replacement suppliers or substitute products.
2.1.2.2 Diminishing manufacturing sources
This is a situation where the available source of suppliers is no longer willing to
produce an item for economic reasons (Builder, 1997:119). The available supply dries
up, making it difficult if not impossible to continue operations that rely on that item,
jeopardizing a firm’s ability to meet customer demands.

Consumer

DMS/MS

Seeks alternate source
or finds replacement

?

Wants to Buy
Won’t/Can’t Sell

This business
relationship
may not survive

Produces replacement or
leaves the market

Producer

Figure 6. Diminishing Manufacturing Sources/Materiel Supply (DMS/MS) Process
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2.1.3 Causes of DMS/MS
Market forces are the primary drivers affecting availability of any product,
whether in the private or public sector, and, if these forces cannot be readily resolved by
the infrastructure in place, the result is a DMS/MS situation (Cordero, 1991). This issue
is even more troublesome in the public sector, because it’s harder to increase the price
paid for an item when it suddenly becomes scarce. The private sector is always more
nimble and can move quickly to buy up remaining supplies to minimize DMS/MS
effects, since they can simply pass on the higher price to their customers as a cost of
doing business. The typical causes for DMS/MS fall into several broad categories:
2.1.3.1 Internal Competition for Resources
If there is strong enough internal competition for production resources that could
be used by a firm elsewhere to increase profit or market share, then existing product lines
are at risk of being either curtailed, reapportioned, or, if necessary abandoned (Builder,
1997:119).
2.1.3.2 Rebalancing a Product Mix
If a firm finds itself too heavily weighted in one product line, exposing it to
unnecessary risk in the event its main income-producer falters in the marketplace or an
interruption adversely impacts production, then a conscious decision could be made to
change its mix of offerings to lessen an overdependence on a particular item. This may
cause a short-term negative impact, but the assumption is that the firm would be healthier
in the long run, much like pruning trees creates more growth in future seasons.
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2.1.3.3 Responding to Outside Factors
If scarcity of a material drives the cost too high to provide profit justification,
or some other outside factor such as newly enacted regulations that are costly to satisfy,
then the cost-benefit to a firm could result in cessation of an item.
2.1.3.4

Coping with Marketplace Realities
If a technology change or breakthrough occurs in the marketplace that provides a

different means of satisfying customer need for an existing product, and the new item
achieves universal appeal, then the company would shift to the better prospect. In many
cases, the DMS/MS information services are not available to many small businesses to
stay ahead of an impending shortage situation, because they simply cannot afford to pay
for such information which means they cannot perform the key element of obsolescence
forecasting critical to effectively mitigate obsolescence before an issue occurs. (Sandborn
and Singh, 2006:120)
All of these reasons may not immediately cause a mass exodus of producers, but a
trend will begin which will slowly erode the previously reliable supply and the number of
firms willing to carry or even provide quotes will diminish. If enough firms depart, then
any infrastructure associated with the operation of the product also will shift away from
supporting it, and the user would find it untenable to keep the item in its own systems,
forcing a redesign or replacement effort. These forms of obsolescence occur daily across
the DoD.
2.1.4

DMS/MS mitigation
DMS/MS can be mitigated through many ways, but the only method that avoids a

reactionary mode of response is one that incorporates an active DMS/MS management
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program as part of a basic acquisition contract. Unless this mitigation process is included
as a contract deliverable, there can be no assurance that DMS/MS concerns will be
discovered well in advance to allow an opportunity to address them proactively,
preventing any manufacturing disruptions.
Mitigation requirements placed on contract can impose on the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) periodic updates in areas such as monitoring and reporting on raw
material price and availability (JPATS PMR, 2010), market trends for new products or
techniques to satisfy existing need, health of sub vendor businesses, and status of
regulatory compliance. A program of planned obsolescence can also be a basic part of a
contract with an expectation that technology will be periodically refreshed at a certain
interval, and, if not outright replaced, upgraded with the latest features of value to the
user.
Other options to mitigate DMS/MS are incentivizing vendors to perform their own
internal DMS/MS management program or subsidize suppliers by means of providing
access to information resources (access to paid databases or subscription information
services). At a minimum, whether or not part of a contractual obligation, a concerted
effort should be undertaken within each OEM to at least periodically review market
conditions that could affect their own supplier base so they can secure their relationship
with their customers by ensuring an uninterrupted flow of existing product or equivalent
substitutes to perform the mission. The entire field of Value Engineering (L. D. Miles
1961) started in the U.S. in the 1940s in response to the lack of critical hardware to satisfy
the nearly insatiable demand for materiel during the peak of World War II production.
The DMS/MS solution under Value Engineering was to find alternate solutions that
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produce the same results without necessarily trying to duplicate the parts exactly.
Instead, the focus was on what function the item was designed to perform and then find
creative ways to achieve this faster and cheaper than the original design. However, not
all DMS/MS resolution can result in lower per unit costs, as changes in operating
environment since a product’s introduction, as well as uncontrollable factors such as
inflation, price of commodities, etc., may raise the price of any alternative chosen.
A final DMS/MS mitigation thought – it is far easier to plan for obsolescence by
building modularity into products, especially high cost defense systems, than to preserve
a supplier base, because, eventually, the extra effort to nurse dwindling industries to
sustain them becomes a case of diminishing returns. The added cost would be better
spent preparing for a transition to alternatives. Modularity also allows for a “remove and
replace” sustainment strategy without needing to redesign or retool. The Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD) is currently sponsoring research into “flexibility of design”
strategies through a Joint Task Force on Open Systems Design. (OUSD AT&L, 2011).
2.2

Sources of Obsolescence

2.2.1

Normal Life Cycle
Once a product or service capability is achieved and can be reliably maintained,

the user community becomes convinced of its utility, and the producer’s natural tendency
is to improve on its performance through refinements to maintain the status quo and stave
off obsolescence. Eventually, however, a different technique or solution appears that
provides better capability, supplanting that status quo. Sometimes this happens through
small, yet progressive design changes until the product or service reaches a plateau
beyond which there is no available technical solution to advance the original concept
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further from a cost-benefit standpoint. One of the most difficult points to grasp is when a
product has reached its full capacity to deliver what was initially envisioned. A tendency
to push for more features is valuable up to a point, but there is threshold beyond which
added elements could significantly detract from the original intent. A good example is
the Swiss Army knife, which, at its core, is a cutting tool. Over the years, designers have
sought to enhance the item by adding more attachments until the higher-end model no
longer resembles a basic tool. And with each added feature, the knife had to keep
compromising its core mission to accommodate additional benefits (Zipkin, 2001:81).
So, when trying to use the blade, it now must compete with other features, which makes
the simple task of cutting cumbersome because the knife has grown to an unwieldy size.
The bottom line, however, is that no single function performs its intended task as well as
a tool devoted solely to that one particular task. Those tradeoffs are accepted to save the
cost by enhancing an existing design rather than developing an entirely new unproven
concept. On rare occasion, a novel approach to meet a need produces a simple, “elegant”
solution, which, once implemented, seems so obvious in retrospect. The design of the
safety pin is one such simple device designed in a moment of inspiration by twisting wire
together. The lesson is that the simplest route is often the most elusive to achieve, even
though that sounds counterintuitive at first thought.
2.2.2 Step Function Technology Shift
Another cause of obsolescence is a sudden shift in technology. Rare instances
occur where something totally unexpected fundamentally breaks the normal cycle of
incremental enhancements that immediately renders some current technologies obsolete,
soon forcing many existing items into extinction, evaporating whatever loyal following
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they may have enjoyed (Olleros, 1986:5-18). History is filled with examples of such
tectonic technology shifts such as the inventions of telegraphy, radio, light bulb, and
airplanes, to name a few.
2.2.3

False Starts and Abandoned Technology
There are other situations where, for example, competing technologies may show

promise to perform a task equally as well, with the potential to cause a fundamental shift
if developed for practical implementation. The expectation is that the marketplace will
force the necessary refinements still needed to realize the full potential of the new
product and that once matured, it will be fully accepted by users. However, if this does
not occur, then the item becomes orphaned or abandoned, and either the existing method
to meet the need remains the defacto standard, or a competing new technology emerges
as the new preferred method.
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2.2.3.1 Examples of False Starts
As shown in Figure 7, an experimental subway concept in New York City was developed
by Alfred Ely Beach (Beach, 2011) in 1870 and operated as a demonstration project until
1873 and covered a distance of one city block, about 300 feet. Although it successfully
demonstrated the ability to provide such a service, expanding this concept on a large
scale was never pursued as the electric locomotive was viewed as a more practical
alternative and the pneumatic transit project was abandoned, the tube walled off, and the
only existing passenger car remains buried under the streets of the city to this day
gathering dust while the Interborough Rapid Transit system, which broke ground in 1900,
now transports an average of 5 million passengers every weekday, and over 1.6 billion
people annually (MTA, 2010).

Figure 7. 1870 Beach Pneumatic Subway New York City, NY (Beach, 2011)
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Figure 8. Edison public electrocution - Topsy the Elephant
at Coney Island on January 4, 1903 using Alternating Current (Wired, 2011)
Another example is Thomas Edison’s desire to electrify the US with Direct
Current (DC) versus the competing method, which used alternative of Alternating
Current (AC) proposed by George Westinghouse. This prompted the famous “current
wars,” with Edison holding macabre public demonstrations to warn of AC’s dangers in
which dogs, cats and even an elephant (Figure 8) (Wired, 2011) were electrocuted with
alternating current. Edison at first failed to realize the huge cost of transmitting DC,
requiring generating stations to be built every few miles to account for line losses. His
idea lacked practicality. Eventually one of Edison’s brilliant associates, Charles
Steinmetz, convinced him that AC was the most practical means of long-range electrical
transmission at a reasonable cost.
The lesson learned is that some ideas are either misguided from the start or are so
far ahead of their time when first introduced that their risk of failure does not justify
significant initial investment until their concept is both proven and universally accepted.
For instance, after losing the current wars, Edison moved on and attempted designing a
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battery powerful enough to operate an automobile. By 1900, 28% of automobiles
produced in the U.S. are powered by electricity. But when Henry Ford introduced the
Model T in 1908 (Figure 9), (Henry Ford Museum, 2011) the first affordable, mass
produced gasoline-powered automobile, the electric car became impractical with the
available state of battery technology in the early 1900s. More than a century would pass
before the concept would again become practical, with the introduction of the Nissan
Leaf, the world’s first mass production all-electric vehicle (Figure 10) (Motor Trend,
2011). Whether the electric car succeeds this time on a massive scale remains to be seen.

Figure 9. Henry Ford’s Model T Automobile Production Line – 1908
(Henry Ford Museum, 2011)

2.2.3.2 Abandoned Technology
The previous two examples provide the background for understanding the case of
the JPATS canopy fracturing system. Existing technologies existed at the time of
adoption but an emerging method that showed promise using a simple light transferring
energy through a fiber optic cable instead of heavier, rigid ballistic-coated lines and
explosives to initiate canopy fracturing. These lines required an explosive charge to
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ignite them, and in turn required a burning fuse to flash inside a ballistic transfer line to a
point where the actual canopy fracturing occurred. The optical initiation offered by CFIS
would reduce the amount of aircraft explosives since it did not require either an initial
charge or explosive coated transfer lines (JPATS PMR, 2010). Initiation for the optical
CFIS used simple piezo-electric crystals that generated a small amount of electricity
when pressure was applied during lever actuation, setting off the light bulbs, and
generating photon energy sufficient to initiate the canopy fracturing sequence.

Figure 10. Nissan Leaf Production Line (2011)
(Motor Trend, 2011)

In reality, the simple optical initiation system was not robust enough to handle the
rigors of the JPATS mission, and reliability suffered with failure rates rising to the point
where the flash module system was not economical. In fact, in FY 2007, the annual
maintenance cost for training aircraft cartridge actuated devices (CAD) used in the
JPATS CFIS were higher than what the USAF paid for either its bomber or fighter
aircraft fleets. The initial promise of lifetime installation and little or no maintenance
proved false once the CFIS flash module was integrating into JPATS and fielded. The
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higher-than-expected routine maintenance costs prompted a study to commence to
replace the light energized CFIS with a legacy alternative that had a proven track record
in other fielded aircraft. So the JPATS CFIS, although shown to be a viable option, never
reached the level of universal acceptability within the aerospace community and therefore
lost the backing of the major suppliers who would have to commit resources based on the
assumption that a sufficient long term market existed that would justify their investment
in equipment and materials to sustain production capability. As this was never realized,
the technology was left unsupported and eventually no longer was produced, leaving
JPATS without adequate supplies of spare parts and forced a design change to a legacy
system in use by multiple existing platforms, thus securing a supply base for the
remainder of the JPATS useful life.
The interesting element of this particular situation is that the flash bulb is not
obsolete in the sense that if enough could be scrounged from warehoused sources, they
would still perform acceptably in the current JPATS CFIS system. But there are no
remaining sources to produce the current design flash bulb which means this situation is
more serious than diminishing sources of supply in that there are no sources available –
the sources are not disappearing, they are extinct. The very technology used to produce
the bulbs has in fact become obsolete with respect to the need for such devices in the
current electronic flash market that supplanted one-use flash bulbs. The original source
of supply has sold off the equipment used to manufacture the current flash bulbs, the
technical skills are no longer in place to resurrect this dormant process and business case
analysis indicates it would be more prudent to develop a new replacement bulb based on
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current technology despite the risk involved in development and integration into an
existing system.
2.3

Obsolescence and DMS/MS Planning

Obsolescence is a situation where the external environment conspires to eliminate the
value once placed on a mainstay product that held a commanding share of market and
was generally considered indispensable. One example would be the overnight loss of the
entire market share for buggy whips once the automobile became the commonly
preferred method of transportation. Obsolescence and DMS/MS are related and one can
result in the other but they are also mutually exclusive. When the environment in which
a product must operate changes so drastically as to prevent the item from functioning,
obsolescence erases the demand. Regardless of whether there are suppliers still willing
or able to produce the item, the lack of demand forces supply base to switch to producing
a new item that users want.
DMS/MS planning, when included as part of a management strategy, typically
seeks to put a process in place to monitor and attempt to accurately anticipate when
demand will wane and predict when replacement technologies will emerge to displace an
existing product, creating a seamless transition to prevent potential production
interruptions. That’s the ideal theory. In practice, DMS/MS planning is not as simple to
implement. It is not a simple phase curve that can be tracked so that the exact amount of
resources is applied just when needed to head off any issues.

If one primary source of

supply decides to restrict output of a previously plentiful commodity, it can cause nearly
instantaneous material supply shortages, if the supply chain lacks resilience. Some
historical cases are Russia and Iran. Russia, the world’s largest producer of titanium,
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(SRAS, 2011 2011) raised fears in the aerospace industry when price hikes for titanium
skyrocketed in 1996. (RAND Corp, 2009) Iran’s mining of the Straits of Hormuz during
the “Tanker Wars” with the US in 1987-1988 (Zatarain, 2009), threatened a cutoff of oil
shipped through this strategic chokepoint during the Iran-Iraq conflict. Even if a source
exists and is willing to produce an item, a natural impediment like a seaway bottleneck
that blocks transportation can produce the material shortage.
2.4

Value Engineering and Risk Management

2.4.1

Value Engineering Definition
Value engineering is the technique of assigning value to all elements of a process

stream to determine which factors contribute the most to total ownership costs. The
ultimate goal is to reduce the cost as much as possible by developing alternative methods
to achieve the same product performance at a lower price. Value Engineering (VE) was
founded by Lawrence D. Miles who applied this technique, originally called Value
Analysis, while working for General Electric around 1940. (Miles, 1961) He was
attempting to solve critical parts shortages in the production of aircraft bombers during
World War II. The basic premise of VE is to decide what functions an item has which
gives it value and then evaluate how to achieve the same function by alternative, less
costly means. Some of Larry Miles’s more famous quotes are: “an item has value if it
has proper function and the right cost,” and “all cost is for function.” Value Engineering
grew out of a need to hire Value Analysts when GE had no internal job descriptions to
hire analysts, but plenty of openings available for engineers.

Value Methodology is

described by the LD Miles Foundation as “a planned expenditure to analyze the functions
of systems, design, criteria, etc. to satisfy needed quality and user requirements at optimal
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cost of ownership” (Miles, 1961:34). In the United States, value engineering is
specifically mandated for federal agencies in Public Law 104-106, which states that each
executive agency shall establish and maintain cost-effective value engineering procedures
and processes (OMB Circular A-131,1993). Value engineering can be considered both a
“problem-solving discipline and incentive mechanism” for developing approaches to
lower ownership cost (Mandelbaum et al, 2008:34).
2.4.2

Risk Management
In terms of supply chain management to avoid DMS/MS or obsolescence, risk

management involves several approaches, all of which address the root causes of both
issues. As with all risk management, all probable outcomes are considered and ranked
according to their probability of occurrence and the severity of the outcome if they do
happen. The current JPATS supplier has been tracking all available supplies of flash
lamps from any source and has even resorted to open purchase on EBay® (EBay, 2011) of
small quantities of stockpiled flash bulbs from various sources that are then harvested and
made into CFIS flash modules. This results in a drop-out rate based on the yield of
useable bulbs that have been stored for years under various conditions, mainly in
uncontrolled environments regarding temperature, humidity, moisture and sunlight
exposure. Nevertheless, this is the only available supply to sustain a capability in the
short-term, there is no other choice but to follow the path of scrounging from every
source that can be found. The only proactive move to exit the window of risk is to apply
more resources to expedite development of a substitute as quickly as possible.
2.5

Supply Availability Monitoring
How do DMS/MS issues occur? While the useable lifespan of a product cannot
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be accurately predicted, due diligence demands at least an effort to consider an alternative
course of action in case a part or key component of a part could someday no longer be
reliably obtained in the marketplace at an acceptable cost. In some cases, planning for
this eventuality turns out not to be needed, since the product itself may become redundant
before any of its subcomponents reach obsolescence. But planning for the possibility that
it will occur during a product’s useful lifetime is low cost insurance to avoid unpleasant
lifecycle cost surprises and should never be ignored in acquisition planning and
execution. It is extremely unlikely in the rapidly changing pace of today’s technology
that a product will remain in its original form for more than a few years or at most a
decade. Although there are rare examples where this has occurred, it should never be
considered the norm. It is doubtful we will ever see again an example similar like the
ubiquitous light bulb that’s still in worldwide use in virtually the same design form as
Edison invented 130 years ago.
2.6

Technology Progression
If a requirement is so elemental to a system that it cannot be avoided through

discovery of a new means that avoids it use, then the best that can be expected is that the
technology matures to either simplify its design or to eliminate a rare ingredient, lowering
the item’s unit cost. One historical example is gold leaf, once used commonly aerospace
applications as recently as 15 years ago, and is no longer a practical raw material.
Although it can be reduced in thickness for manufacturing purposes to between 0.1 and
0.125 m, which is almost transparent, it is still costly in today’s market of
approximately $1430 per troy ounce. Surprisingly, in some cases a technology is adapted
to meet an alternate need for which it was not originally conceived and yet performs
30

remarkably well. An example from the pharmaceutical industry is Minoxidil®, (National
Institutes of Health, 2011) the popular ointment used to treat male pattern baldness.
Marketed under the commercial name Rogaine, it was a drug originally developed to treat
high blood pressure. It was discovered to have an interesting side effect – an ability to
increase growth of body hairs. And since the patent expired in 1996 for the proprietary
formulation, it is now available for mass cut-rate public consumption, to the delight of
barbers concerned over dwindling numbers of baby-boomer clients.
2.7

Summary
Obsolescence is part of lifecycle logistics planning. It is a safe assumption that

some, if not most, of the components in a system will undergo further refinements over
time to enhance their performance, and their replacements sold to existing users. There is
a risk of losing market share for users who choose not to upgrade to a higher value-added
offering, since their competition will most likely do so. Obsolescence replacement may
also include enhancements such as added features to satisfy spin-off demands that may
have arisen after product introduction and, owing to advancements in technology or
process development, the improved item may cost no more or even less than the original
item. Diminishing Manufacturing Sources/Material Supply (DMS/MS) issues cannot
always be planned or predicted effectively. They arise for financial reasons in the
marketplace when there is either insufficient demand or profit to be gained from
supplying a product on the open market and therefore no incentive for existing suppliers
to continue producing the item. Moving to a producer using cheaper labor or overseas
production are ways to stave off an eventual loss of supply from domestic sources, but
beyond a certain point, even the lowest cost producer will find it unprofitable. Changes
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to a product formulation or construction can preserve the source if the demand is
sufficient, but this also has its limits and ultimately reaches a point of diminishing return.
DMS/MS is best mitigated by accepting acceptable substitutes using methods such as
Value Engineering to identify critical elements of performance needed from end items
and then creatively developing solutions to achieve the result using multiple available
resources to satisfy demand.
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III.
3.1

Method of Optimization

Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the approach to the general methodology used to setup a

parametric model to conduct sensitivity analysis by varying overall cost and schedule to
retrofit the USAF and USN fleets. The model is subject to the constraints of maximum
production capacity and the operational user’s ability to cycle a portion of their fleet
through depot retrofit while still meeting mission requirements. The value of an
optimization model is measured by how comprehensive the objective function is in
capturing relevant parameters which can be adjusted by manipulating constraints to
develop an array of available operating scenarios. This is especially useful in sensitivity
analysis since parameter value weightings often shift in actual practice to correspond with
real-time changes in the operating environment. For example, a program office may be
constrained by funding at project inception only to later realize a windfall from fallout
activity in competing programs which are unable to execute their funding. Therefore, the
ability of the model to iterate easily over multiple courses of action provides the
flexibility to quickly execute among alternatives and is key to capitalize on opportunities
to maximize the efficient use of resources.
One measure of a model’s utility is the amount of what can be adjusted by
weighting parameters of most value to the user. This ability is important to all
organizations, whether in the private or public sector, because of the constant demand for
hypothetical analyses to adjust to unplanned effects on steady-state operating conditions.
Responding to circumstances out of management’s control is both the greatest challenge
and opportunity to excel that faces leadership, because the competition is facing the same
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situation, and only those applying the best response first will gain an advantage. Whether
there is a critical shortage of material, a natural disaster, or changes to the spending plan,
an ideal model is constructed to be nimble, so that it can mitigate unexpected events to
minimize detrimental effects as well as capitalize on opportunities where and when they
present themselves.
The proposed concept for the replacement flash module was reverse-engineered
from the original design, and will use ceramic instead of gold as the reflective coating on
the module’s inner wall, with no appreciable degradation of transmitted light output.
Unexpected benefits will also occur by replacing the five individual bulbs now used in
the module with the proposed annular design (Figure 9), since the annular internal
volume produces higher light output than the 5-bulb design with a smaller footprint,
saving space and weight.

Figure 11. Design concept for the replacement flash bulb technology
(JPATS PMR, 2010)
This allows the module to have a higher wall thickness, which provides a better margin
for error when welding the end caps to the flash module. And since weld burn-through is
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the largest factor in yield loss for the current flash lamp, the annular design should be
lower the manufacturing scrap rate.
3.2

Optimization Model
The model prepared in this thesis used was based on optimization modeling

described in Spreadsheet Modeling & Decision Analysis, 5th ed. (Ragsdale, 2007). The
methodology in this reference derives optimal solutions to problems containing multiple
options to achieve objectives. For each case, the option was carried out to the point
where it was determined that no additional value was added by continued iterations,
forcing a best available final solution. The objective will seek to minimize total
ownership cost. Three sets of decision variables are needed: Li for the number of legacy
configurations remaining in year i; INTi for the number of interim configurations; and
LTSi for the number of long term configurations, for year i = 1, …, 20. Each
configuration corresponds to one aircraft. Legacy systems are a sunk cost and thus are
not considered in the model’s objective function, which is shown in equation 1:
(1)
Equation 1 minimizes the total retrofit cost, considering both interim and long term
configurations. The objective function solutions are subject to the following constraints:
1. INTi, LTSi, Li are integer

for all i = 1,…, 20

2.

0 < INTi < 187

for all i = 1,…, 20

3.

0 < LTSi < 70

for all i = 5,…, 20

4.

INTi + LTSi + Li = 747

for all i = 1,…, 20

5.

for all j = 1,…,20
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7.


LTSi = 0

for all i = 1,…, 4

Li – Li-1 + INTi = 0

for all i = 1,…,20

8.
9.

10. INTj = INTj-1 – LTSj-1 – Lj-1

for all j = 5,…,20

11. LTSj = LTSj-1 + INTj-1 + Lj-1

for all j = 5,…,20

Constraint 1 limits the solution options to whole numbers since the replacement items
cannot be procured in fractional units. Constraint 2 limits the interim production rate to
a level which will retrofit at most 187 aircraft per year. This reflects an average of the
production ramp up and the expected steady state rates which will maintain the required
level of quality to satisfy performance requirements.

Constraint 3 limits the long term

production rate to 70 units per year from year 5, when it is first available, through year
20. This is based on the maximum aircraft the user can induct into depot level
maintenance while still meeting mission readiness. The long term solution requires
complete removal and replacement of the existing CFIS which will remove aircraft from
service for 5-7 days. Constraint 4 defines the three canopy fracturing system options
available, including multiple configurations fielded at the same time. Constraint 5 limits
the total CFIS fielded to the summation of the legacy and interim units minus the long
term solution, which all must equal 747. Constraint 6 limits the maximum number of
interim solutions deployed to less than or equal to 747. Since the development time for
the interim solution is shorter than for long term, there is a possibility that legacy units
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will have reached their useable installed life before long term units are available, leaving
the entire fleet deployed only with interim.

Constraint 7 limits the first available

fielding of a long term solution to year 5 to account for its development lead time.
Constraint 8 specifies that the sum of the interim and long term solutions fielded from
Year 5 to 20 must equal 747. This accounts for the retirement of the legacy units after
their 4-year installed life expires. Constraint 9 specifies a one-for-one replacement of
legacy units with interim units until all legacy units are removed from the fleet due to
expired 4 year installed life. Constraint 10 limits the interim units in year j to the interim
units from the previous year minus the contribution from the previous year’s legacy or
long-term units produced for years 5 through 20, since year 5 is the first year long-term
units are available. Constraint 11 limits the long-term units in year j to the long-term
units from the previous year plus the number of long-term units that replaced interim
units in year j, plus the contribution from the previous year’s legacy units for years 5
through 20.
Program management will be provided data that shows the cost benefit of
attempting to expedite the retrofit of the JPATS fleet from the current CFIS system to a
more reliable system currently in use on other USAF/USN aircraft. Since the
unscheduled ongoing maintenance burden of the JPATS CFIS is excessive and growing
daily, there is incentive to explore completing the complete retrofit as soon as practical.
The model will assess the point of diminishing return for additional funds expended.
3.2.5

Solving for the Objective Function
The Excel Solver optimization tool calculates a total installed cost per aircraft for

retrofitting INTi and LTSi into the fleet and will include the following:
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1) Burn down of the existing Legacy units already fielded
2) Replacement of Li units during required time change out using the remaining
stores of Li units
3) The introduction of the INTi and subsequent replacement of Li with INTi units.
4) The introduction of the LTSi at a point where all of the Li units have been
exhausted and the eventual burn down of the INTi units until they are all replaced
by LTSi in the final fleet design configuration.
5) The total cost for implementation of the transition from Li to INTi to LTSi is
calculated for different production rates of the respective hardware and the retrofit
of aircraft to the different configurations.
6) The model’s projected INTi and LTSi initial production rates are based on
historical rates for similar JPATS ejection system life support hardware. The best
indicator of throughput constraint is the user’s ability to provide aircraft to induct
into the retrofit line to install the final LTSi design solution while maintaining
operational readiness at acceptable levels. Since the INTi solution is installed at
the organizational level as part of routine maintenance, there is no inconvenience
burden to the user as there is with LTSi . However, the longer INTi remains in
place, there is continued concern over the additional cost of maintenance the
existing laser-based CFIS system. This cannot be classified as a risk since it is an
undefined consequence. Multiple failure points in the CFIS have continued to
fail prematurely at unpredictable rates and each has a different cost. In total, aside
from the need to address obsolescence, the lack of robustness and system
reliability is the main reason for replacing the entire CFIS with the LTSi .
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3.2.6

Sensitivity Analysis
To evaluate whether any benefit can be obtained by shifting constraints within

reasonable limits of production capacity, two trials were run changing the following:
(1) The annual number of field retrofits of the LTSi accomplished per year.
(2) The end date for completing LTSi retrofit using the original retrofit schedule
to assess whether extending the end date would derive any total cost savings.
The analysis will run iterations of the fleet retrofit rate per year per Table 2. Note:
Table 2 – Sensitivity Analysis
Configuration

Li

INTi

LTSi

Retrofit Rate

N/A1

70

70

80

80

90

90

100

100

120

120

1

Li units are no longer in production. Entire fleet is currently fielded with Li . Li spares available until
2014 when INTi becomes available. Last remaining Li units installed in 2014 expire and removed from
service by 2016.
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IV.

Analysis and Results

The approach taken to develop a mathematical model captured the major cost
elements of the simultaneous development and acquisition of both the interim and longterm solutions. The cost elements were scaled according to their proportional
representation in the fleet mix of total USN and USAF aircraft procured. An Excel
network model was set up to solve the objective function, according to the coefficients
and constraints needed to accurately bound the problem statement. This allowed Solver
to run optimization trials and perform sensitivity analyses based on the trade-off between
cost and time to implement. The results indicate the optimal mixture of interim solution
parts to be purchased one development is concluded that will satisfy the demand for
ongoing maintenance (sustainment) while the long-term solution is deployed and begins
service.
4.1

Application of Methodology
A graph was generated within the model to represent the burn-down of the

Interim units and the ramp-up of the Long Term units. The resulting graph generated of
the interim versus long-term solution clearly depicts a period where the interim is phased
out while the long-term solution is slowly integrated into the fleet. The best-case
scenario is a seamless transition with no excess interim product remaining once the longterm solution is on place. This ideal situation will never occur in reality, which is why an
optimization can only be a best solution based on contingencies.
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4.2

Graphical Optimization Model Results
Figures 13-15 provide plots of data results from Excel Solver model iterations of

the Objective Function using different constraints which varied production rates for the
fleet retrofit to the INTi and LTSi configurations.
4.3

Contingencies Affecting Optimization
Occasionally, factors out of the control of program managers will impact the

implementation of optimization efforts and may delay the realization of benefits or affect
the overall cost benefit upon project completion.

All models must be based on initial

conditions and assumptions from which constraints are established. When reality
intervenes, the model must be adjusted to accommodate for these uncontrollable
elements. A robust model possesses the flexibility to make these adjustments without
requiring a major overhaul of its logic and programming. Some examples of these
factors impacting long-term solution retrofit are:
1) Quality or qualification issues that delay fielding LTSi
2) Inability to predict accurately the reliability of the LTSi once fielded
3) Difficulties with installing the LTSi until several installations are completed,
which cause reduction of required throughput to achieve optimization.
3) Startup issues with infant mortality of components that may have been
qualified individually but not yet tested in an operational environment as an
integrated system.
4) Retrofit funding constraints that affect timing of aircraft inductions into the
modification line, delaying retrofit beyond the ideal timeline predicted by the
model.
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5) Operational needs of the users may require a smaller percentage of the fleet to
receive the retrofit per year, even if excess retrofit capacity is available.
6) Delays in long-lead parts from various suppliers due to, for instance, raw
material shortages or sub-vendor throughput constraints.
Because there was a sunk cost incurred in developing the interim solution, which
has no value once the LTSi is fully implemented, there could be a management bias to
produce excess interim solution items to account for unanticipated startup or retrofit
delays. Resisting this temptation is imperative if the optimization is to be realized.
Although there will never be a perfect solution, minimizing the interim excess is the
ultimate goal since the product becomes obsolete for the JPATS fleet once the LTSi is
fielded, because LTSi eliminates the flash-module entirely in its basic configuration. And
each interim flash module is expected to have a predicted unit cost in the five-figure
range. With a total of 8 flash modules per aircraft, the estimated cost for each INTi
installation is approximately $80K per aircraft, which is hardly a cost avoidance to be
taken lightly. The downside of not procuring sufficient supplies of INTi flash modules
would be degraded mission capability, but if there is a quick-turnaround production lead
time for INTi this may allow the USG to keep minimum inventories and thus reduce
holding costs while still maintaining levels of aircraft availability that may not be
optimum, but are still acceptable to satisfy the mission. This would ultimately be
resolved upon LTSi retrofit.
The model helps support program office decisions on timing of funding needs,
execution timetables and vendor expectations to ensure mission capability. The intent is
to answer questions such as how quickly to procure and retrofit the INTi and LTSi , or
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whether it is economically feasible to resurrect the dormant manufacturing line by reverse
engineering and manufacturing flash bulbs that have not been produced for 25-30 years?
If production of the Li bulb is deemed too costly, then how much of the replacement bulb
should be made as INTi until a newly designed CFIS can be fielded? What is the optimal
cost-benefit break-even point between interim bulb and the long term solution in terms of
development and procurement costs? As there is always a margin of error when
estimating cost-benefit, the program manager would also benefit if the analysis also
provided a range of options, ranked from worst, most probable, to best case.
Non-Feasible Long-Term Solution (LTS) for 70 Retrofit/Year
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Figure 12. LTSi @ 70 Retrofits/year, Cost = $412.7 M

Shown in Figure 12, at 70 retrofits/year, there is insufficient time available to completely
retrofit the fleet before the end of the aircraft service life of 24 years. This is a Nonfeasible option.
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Long-Term Solution for 80 Retrofits/Year
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Figure 13. LTSi @ 80/year, Cost = $399.1M
Figure 13 shows one option that will complete the entire fleet retrofit by 2025. The
model constraints were then varied to calculate the lowest cost option. This option was
not the lowest cost.

Figure 14. LTSi @ 90/Year, Cost = $385.0M
This is the lowest cost option which meets the criteria of retrofitting the entire fleet while
maintaining a 747 aircraft operational inventory. This trial is the optimal solution for
three reasons:
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1) The current retrofit line operates at a rate of approximately 5-6 aircraft per month.
Increasing this to a rate of 7-8 per month is a reasonable increase to negotiate with the
user to reduce the ongoing maintenance cost overrun and subsequent non-availability
associated with the existing CFIS.
2) A 90 retrofits/year rate demonstrates the lowest total cost.
3) There is no cost benefit to increase the rate of retrofit to replace LTSi faster than 90
per year. The cost calculated by the model is greater for both 100 and 120 retrofits per
year. These increases would also incur additional infrastructure costs to add more
retrofit line capacity that is not captured in the mode.
Long-Term Solution for 100 Retrofits/Year
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Figure 15. LTSi @ 100/Year, Cost = $403.9 M
This option accelerates the retrofit without any corresponding reduction in total
cost. Also, non-recurring costs not captured by the model incurred in this option involve
increasing retrofit line capacity. This further increases the cost of this non-optimum
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option. Additionally, the user would not be able to supply this number of aircraft to
induct into retrofit without degrading their mission availability rate.
Long-Term Solution for 120 Retrofits/Year
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Figure 16. LTSi @ 120/Year, Cost = $402.3 M
Similarly to Figure 16, there is no cost benefit to increasing the retrofit rate to 120
aircraft/year if the cost is higher and the user cannot accommodate that number of aircraft
in not mission capable (NMC) status during the retrofit period.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
As shown in Table 3, the lowest cost is 90 LTSi retrofit installations per year.
There is no added value derived from increasing the retrofit throughput higher than
90/year because this would entail adding an additional retrofit line to the present OEM’s
capacity and require paying overtime to meet the increased capacity surge, both of which
would negate any added benefit from retrofitting sooner.
The JPATS users would also incur operational hardships if forced to induct more
than 90 aircraft per year into the retrofit line. The model’s optimal rate of 90 per year is
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coincidentally the OEM’s maximum rated JPATS production capacity. Although this
value has never been sustained in practice since initial production began in 2001, it is
within the capability of existing manufacturing planning and assembly processes.
JPATS operators would have to adjust their training syllabus to accommodate this rate,
but the cost benefit would justify this modification of their training curriculum, since the
savings would be $14.1 M when compared with to the next available alternative of 100
retrofits/year.
Table 3. Cost Versus Long-Term Solution Installation Rate
Production Rate
(Installs/Year)
70
80
90
100
120

Cost ($M)
412.7
399.1
385
403.9
402.3

Table 4 shows the relationship between varying the end date for installation of the
long-term solution. Its purpose is to identify any benefit from surging the retrofit to
assess if the total cost is lower by completing it sooner. The data in indicates the
installation end date does not varying significantly when the LTSi retrofit is increased
from the optimal 90 per year to 100 or 120 per year. The end date remains 2025 in all
cases because it is based on availability of LTSi retrofit kits (there is a fixed rate of
production) and this acceleration does not factor in the added cost of extra shifts or
expanding the retrofit line’s capacity to accommodate the higher aircraft flow rate. The
cost for 100 or 120 retrofits/year is higher than the optimal 90/year as expected due to the
required additional resources to increase capacity. The user will endure operational
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hardship if required to provide more than 90 aircraft/year for retrofit, and the
modification line will incur additional costs to expand capacity,
Table 4. End Date Versus Long-Term Solution Installation Rate
LTSi Installation
Rate/Year
60
80
90
100
120

LTSi
Installation
End Date
2027
2026
2025
2025
2025

Figure 17 is the notional schedule for the Li replacement units showing the phase-in
and overlap until the entire fleet is retrofitted to the LTSi design solution in 2032.

Figure 17. Notional Implementation Schedule
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V.

Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Summary/Conclusion
This thesis analyzed the three current design configurations for the JPATS CFIS and
developed an optimization model to determine the lowest cost approach for retrofit the
JPATS fleet to a more robust design that eliminates the maintenance drivers adversely
affecting reliability. The model determined the lowest cost for the best retrofit rate of 90
aircraft per year. Coincidentally, the steady-state condition for the present modification
line is between 6-7 aircraft per month (72-84/year), making the 90/year optimal rate a
reasonable stretch goal to achieve. In addition, the user can be reasonably expected to
support this retrofit throughput knowing that the maintenance drivers will be eliminated
with the LTS introduction. The eventual cost-benefit to the user more than compensates
for the short-term inconvenience to mission capable
5.1.1 Structuring an optimality problem
Optimality can only be achieved for a specific set of parameters of value to the
user. For this reason, optimality is by nature subjective. Another aspect affecting
optimality is the complexity of the solution model, driven mainly by the amount of
simultaneous constraints that must weigh into the final answer. The more comprehensive
the goal, the more constrained the model’s mathematical formula will be, and
consequently compromises must be made to accommodate all of the concurrent demands
on the model. In simple terms, the more you are trying to accomplish at once, the harder
it is to simultaneously satisfy all goals equally, forcing inevitable compromises.
Optimization is not a process that normally achieves immediate results, although if the
initial conditions are so poor, even its short-term effects can be dramatic. Optimization is
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designed to be a progressive exercise that requires patience, perseverance and flexibility
to allow the necessary tweaking during implementation to achieve a best outcome.
5.1.1.1 Near-term optimization
A near term optimality solution, as in the case of a manufacturing line, must be
simple enough to address the user’s most pressing need and provide easily run sensitivity
analysis to identify steps to be taken to keep the line operating without interruption,
producing product on schedule at an acceptable cost. There is less optimization
underway in the near term as it simply seeks to first achieve consistency and then form a
baseline from which to make further improvements.
5.1.1.2 Midterm optimization
A midterm optimization tries to look several years into the future to assess the
factors that will impact producibility, with a goal to structure the environment outside of
the immediate area of control so that it sustains, complements and supports the operation.
Mid-term goals also seek to instill optimization principles in the sub vendor network the
producer relies on so that all parties in the supply network benefit from obtaining the
highest value at the least cost.
5.1.1.3 Long Term optimization
Long term optimization looks at the current product, tries to envision where the
demand will be in the out-years, whether the current production will be sustainable, and if
not, what steps must be taken in the near or midterm to begin a transition. Long term
optimization could result in a decision that producing an item is no longer in the best
interest of a firm and that the product should be abandoned. The cost-benefit must be
carefully reviewed so that an opportunity remains to still serve markets where a
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technology may still be in demand, although infrequently, at a premium. This would, in
some cases, justify keeping a product line in preservation state but still capable of startup
and production on a small scale to meet demand. Examples are the specialty products
produced for the nuclear power industry which carry a high premium, are produced by
only a few select, certified manufacturers, and must be available immediately during
periodic scheduled maintenance shutdowns. Another example is specialty steel
manufactured for the defense industry. The Berry Amendment (U.S. Code Title 10
Section 2533a 2011, Title 10 Section 2533a), which, along with the Buy America Act
(US Code Title 41 Section 116 1993, Sec 1638b), requires material used in
manufacturing DoD hardware to be produced by U.S. suppliers. In these examples,
maintaining a foothold presence in certain markets, which by mandate are restricted to
domestic suppliers, is clearly not an example of a long term strategy, rather, they are
examples of how an overall optimization model can include multiple aspects which, by
themselves, are not necessarily optimal.
Long term optimization attempts to divine the lifespan of a product, predict future
demand and assess when a replacement should be ready to satisfy the future demand.
The purpose of long term optimization is to place the entity acquiring the item in the best
position to meet demand at the lowest cost, with the most consistency, efficiency and
effectiveness under the conditions at the time of future delivery. The best example in the
aerospace industry is the legendary Southwest Airlines long-term fuel contract pricing
optimization scheme. Southwest had the foresight and wherewithal to negotiate contracts
with fuel suppliers which guaranteed future prices, similar to call options in the stock
market. They had predicted a spike in future fuel cost and it turns out they were correct.

51

While many of their competitors were losing money and instituting numerous nuisance
fees on their customer base to try to make up for lost profits, Southwest remained
profitable and not only avoided imposing fees such as baggage check, they were able to
incorporate this advantage over the completion into their advertisements.
5.2

Future Research Questions
1. Could the OEM have known about the flash bulb DMS/MS? JPATS reached

its current DMS/MS state because there was no incentive for the OEM to be proactive
with DMS/MS. The JPATS program was structured to require the US government to pay
for all obsolescence mitigation above $100K. This threshold was determined reasonable
during source selection based on the premise that a commercially-derived system would
not experience the type of obsolescence issues typical of the DoD’s more advanced, stateof-the-art aircraft systems with no commercial equivalent. In retrospect, this proved not
as valid an assumption as envisioned, and the $100K OEM-responsibility threshold was
found to be too low to be useful in cost-sharing mitigation of all but the most minor cases
of obsolescence, since virtually all JPATS DMS/MS issues to date have exceeded $100K
in value with resolution paid for by the US government. The question remains whether a
means to provide an equitable balance can be reached and incorporated into a production
contract at a program’s inception such that the OEM and the customer share a fair portion
of the risk. The question that must be resolved in negotiation is that fair balance, so each
party bears a portion of the risk.
2. If JPATS COTS procurement was mandated, then, in retrospect, is there an
alternative to pure COTS that would provide better USG protection?
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In a situation when COTS is the preferred alternative to satisfy a DoD mission need, there
must be a rigorous review early on in the acquisition execution strategy of all unique
military requirements that require additional analysis, testing or other validation in a
realistic operating environment to ensure operational suitability and effectiveness will be
met for the non-commercial user. By its nature, a COTS component is designed to
appeal to a larger broader-based market, optimized to provide the greatest value in terms
of initial cost and typically not designed to remain in service as long as the military user
expects items to perform.
3. Perhaps a hybrid solution is necessary with cost sharing and incentivizing?
Use of an incentive system similar to an AFTO 22 Suggestion Program where a flat
reward is earned for accepted suggestions. Or even more attractive to the OEM is the use
of Value Engineering Change Proposals (VECP) where the manufacturer shares in the
benefit achieved by receiving a cash payment for a portion of any savings realized.
4. Is it possible to incentivize constant DMS/MS monitoring to look for and
recommendation proactive actions that eliminate DMS/MS before it occurs?
For instance, OEM IR&D savings ideas with USG paying OEM 60% of eventual savings
realized, but payment would be in arrears to ensure that the actual savings occur. USG
would be required to support the effort and follow through on the implementation. If it
fails, USG would still own rights to data gathered and OM would be paid for Bid &
Proposal costs incurred.
5. Who should be responsible for managing parts obsolescence? Effective
obsolescence management is clearly in the best interest of both the prime and the
customer receiving the product, but who should be responsible for paying for the effort?
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Would cost sharing be a better alternative if subsequent savings are also shared? In DoD
acquisition, is the US government primarily responsible since an OEM cannot be
expected to anticipate future parts shortages from technology and market shifts that
adversely impact their supply chain?
6. Should the US government always pay the most in resolving JPATS DMS/MS
since they derive the most benefit? Is this really the case? If so, is the USG paying for
what should be normal cost of doing business for their OEMs? If so, is the USG
subsidizing the OEM’s operational cost to maintain competitiveness? And if so, is this
bad policy in light of current international competition where foreign nations routinely
subsidize their domestic industries to ensure their competitiveness and lock-out foreign
producers selling to their own local markets?
It is important to understand how obsolescence occurs in the normal course of
acquisition and to recognize ways to avoid simply reacting to an adverse condition
caused by obsolescence. Value engineering is used to identify required functionality so
that consistent performance delivery criteria can be established, allowing each option to
be fairly assessed so the best course of action is pursued at minimal cost. It is generally
accepted that all acquisitions are unique in the sense that following every step in the
overall procurement process is not necessary in every situation. Applying the best
outcome solution to the JPATS CFIS will involve tailoring to achieve the immediate goal
of ensuring an interim solution is in place before available supplies of spares are
exhausted.
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5.3

JPATS DMS/MS Situation
The CFIS DMS/MS problem facing JPATS arose as a result of several factors,

which are discussed in the following subsections.
5.3.1

Introducing a known technology into an unproven application
During JPATS development, an attempt was made to anticipate the next

technological shift in the method used to fracture aircraft canopies during ejection. An
optical based system showed promise by employing a simple light source as and fiber
optic signal transfer lines instead of the legacy ballistic method used in other fielded
USAF and USN aircraft consisting of explosives encased in armored lines.
There was an element risk involved in this approach, but early innovation in
principle should not be avoided entirely since many products began life with different
unrealized potential but later thrived when alternative uses were discovered, often by
accident. A good example is the removable “Post-it” removable notes from Minnesota
Mining and manufacturing Corporation (3M). When a chemist failed to produce the
desired results from an experimental adhesive formulation, the commercial research &
development effort stalled. The chemist used some of the batch to glue page markers on
his hymnal in the church choir. The reusable feature of his “failed” glue formula became
a new product line and a ubiquitous stationery item.
In the JPATS case, the use of flash bulbs designed for disposable consumer
applications, was an unknown that carried significant risk in terms of durability, since
there was no reliability data to judge its utility from similar aircraft applications.
Unfortunately for JPATS, the gamble did not pay off since the operating cost for the
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fiber-optic system became too costly to sustain over the life of the platform, far exceeded
comparable costs for legacy systems.
Given that General Electric decided to stop producing the flash bulbs when the
JPATS aircraft design was being developed, the flash module supplier placed what it
considered to be a “lifetime buy” order for flash lamps before manufacturing ceased.
This is a common practice in the defense industry as suppliers move in and out of various
markets when profitability is no longer assured for a product line. The flash lamp
lifetime buy placed was based on the predicted for the CFIS system which indicated that
parts would last at least 12 years before requiring replacement. The JPATS aircraft has a
planned service life of 24 years, through 2025. In reality, the CFIS initiators have been
failing at a rate which will exhaust the entire “lifetime supply” of lamps in 2013, two
years before final production ends for the JPATS Navy buy under current conditions. At
a nominal production rate of 60 aircraft per year, that would create a deficit of up to 120
aircraft unable to be fielded due to a lack of flash modules for the production canopies.
This would reduce the US Navy’s fleet by 40%, negatively impacting student pilot
training rates; jeopardizing follow-on advanced training and degrading overall mission
readiness. This would also introduce a logistics shortfall created by an insufficient
supply to satisfy production line demands or sustainment of fielded aircraft undergoing
scheduled maintenance.
Malcolm Baca (Baca, 2005:1) states that “one problem (in obsolescence) is the
continuing decline of the purchasing power of U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for
components. Another problem related to DOD’s weakening purchasing power is that
fewer components are needed.” Both of these factors contribute to a shrinking supplier
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base, since the potential lower volume of parts to be produced no longer justifies the
added administrative burden of dealing with the Department of Defense.
5.3.2

Lack of a DMS/MS mitigation strategy addressing all supply chain tiers
There was no attempt to contractually impose a DMS/MS management

requirement on any of the JPATS sub-tier suppliers, which is why the looming flash bulb
supply crisis was not detected until it became an issue. In fairness to the original
developers, the speed at which the integral flash was introduced into modern photography
could not be accurately predicted in the 1990 timeframe that the JPATS design was
initially conceived. The actual JPATS flash module change out cycle has been 18-24
months since the inception of field operations, as compared to the initial 4 year
prediction. This amounts to $300M in additional unplanned life cycle cost that the
program would have to absorb if no change was made to the existing CFIS design,
equivalent to the cost of 50 additional JPATS aircraft.
5.3.3 Lack of reliability data to estimate accurate operational costs
This was also caused by no other similar fielded applications from which to draw
lessons learned from operational experience. The resulting underestimation of what
constituted a “lifetime buy” contributed to the current time urgency of an April 2013
deadline for exhausting all remaining flash modules in the inventory.
In particular, since a commercial Off-The-Shelf (OTS) purchasing strategy was
used for the JPATS procurement, there was no effort to analyze the specific design
elements for operational feasibility which may have uncovered some of the shortcomings
of the CFIS design approach chosen. As such, the CFIS was not pursued as part of
planned obsolescence since the expected installed lifetimes of the components did not
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necessitate such scrutiny. In hindsight, insufficient “what-if” risk analysis was performed
on a critical system. Lesson learned: New technology cannot accurately predict its
utility until several years of operational usage are available. If flight safety critical, risk
analysis must identify the risk early and mitigation plans put in place to avoid any
possibility of operational stand down or production line interruption. Unproven
technology should not be considered for large production run programs where a
miscalculation will result in a large retrofit cost to correct any deficiencies. A smaller
effort such as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD) would be better
suited for attempting to evaluate the value of a new technology. In the case of
commercial-derivative procurement, the design elements must be reviewed to ensure that
this risk is avoided.
Planning for obsolescence is a requirement of any well-managed program. Given
the uncertainties of when a technology will lose its allure to be supplanted by an
emerging method, it is virtually impossible to predict with any accuracy the exact
moment when the effort should be started. Despite these doubts, it is still imperative that
the best effort must be made to ward off any program interruptions caused by
obsolescence, using the most efficient methods to avoid excessive cost. An important
point to consider is what Singh and Sandborn describe as knowing the difference between
“refresh and redesign.” Refresh comes short of a total redesign and if properly executed
can extend the life of existing systems without incurring the high expense of a total
redesign and integration.
In an October 2008 Government Accountability Office Report (GAO, 2008:09-05),
“Obsolescence Driven Design Refresh Planning or Sustainment-Dominated Systems,” it
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was noted that the Department of Defense was not monitoring the supplier base for
obsolescence concerns in a standardized manner that could be applied throughout the
department. Instead, the response was focused on supplier efforts on particular programs
or sectors of the defense industry. In the case of JPATS, which began as a commercial
derivative program, there was no contractual obligation placed on the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) to monitor the supply base viability using any established
methodology or to report trends and track technology development and market
availability. And although JPATS does have an internal DMS/MS program that has
actively sought to remain ahead of known pending obsolescence issues such as the rapid
replacement of analog gauges by multi-function cockpit displays, the OEM was
responsible for following their internal supply chain management policies to periodically
monitor their suppliers and anticipate any obsolescence concerns to allow enough
advance notice to take appropriate mitigation actions. In practice, this is an imprecise
exercise, owing to the nature of initial logistics sustainment planning which relies on
predictions using best available estimates at product introduction. In the case of JPATS
CFIS, initial reliability predictions turned out to be grossly inaccurate, forcing a
management decision to abandon the original system.

But simultaneously, an

unanticipated obsolescence issue arose due to higher than expected consumption of CFIS
spares caused by the low reliability, which only actual field service data could provide.
Despite program efforts to make CFIS flash components “lifetime buys” prior to lamp
production line cessation, these lifetime predictions also underestimated the demand.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to attempt to develop a methodology for
assisting program manager’s to decide what actions to take which will, as closely as
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possible, satisfy both user demand for a system while expending only what is absolutely
necessary to meet that demand. The luxury of estimating on the high side when
calculating safety stock is not a prudent or tolerable in the current environment stressing
increased efficiencies in defense procurement. Nor should this practice of avoiding
potential loss of availability by carrying excess spares ever be viewed as a preferable
business method. However, the nature of defense procurement necessitates an inherent
inefficiency by design in the overall procurement process which must be acknowledged
and included in acquisition planning. This inefficiency stems from two areas. First, there
is no guarantee of complete accuracy in any prediction situation, so, for example, a foot
soldier on patrol in a combat zone cannot accurately estimate how much ammunition is
needed for every enemy encounter, nor can they always maintain a percent accuracy for
every shot expended. This requires overestimation of ammo stockpiles to provide a
cushion for these unknowns. Secondly, in the example of naval ship deployments, an
aircraft carrier wing cannot estimate with complete accuracy the amount and type of
maintenance needed on its air assets, and there is no Just-In-Time inventory
replenishment available at sea as there would be, for example, in a commercial
environment such as with Toyota’s tight-knit supplier base that can custom produce and
deliver parts within days based on the appropriate demand signal.
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in April 2007 (GAO,
2007:07-232) cited opportunities for the US Air Force to save billions in spare parts
inventory by avoiding excessive inventory holding costs. The report state that “more
than half of the Air Force’s secondary inventory (spare parts), worth an average of $31.4
billion, was not needed to support required on-hand and on-order inventory levels from
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fiscal years 2002 through 2005, although increased demand due to ongoing military
operations contributed to slight reductions in the percentage of inventory on hand and the
number of years of supply it represents.” So even when factoring in the “foot soldier
inefficiencies,” there were only slight reductions in inventory. In fact, “the value of Air
Force on-order inventory not needed to support required inventory levels increased by
about 7.8 percent, representing an average of 52 percent ($1.3 billion) of its on-order
inventory… GAO calculated that it costs the Air Force from $15 million to $30 million
annually to store its unneeded items. Inventory not needed to support required inventory
levels can be attributed to many long-standing problems, such as decreasing demands,
retaining items used to support aging weapon systems that have diminishing sources of
supply or are being phased out of service…” The report also points out an irony in all the
excess: “although more than half of its secondary inventory was not needed to support
required levels, the Air Force still had shortages of certain items. From fiscal years 2002 2005, the percentage and value of the Air Force’s inventory shortages remained the same
at about 8 percent and $1.2 billion.
5.4

Lessons Learned

5.4.1 How could this DMS/MS situation have worked better?
Incentivize the OEM with Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECP) option.
Right now, it is economically more profitable for the OEM to not use VECP but instead
bid on ECPs since they are always the sole source.
5.4.2 What is the real value of FAA certification after an aircraft is delivered?
There’s not much value after aircraft delivery. Military certification is commonly
used to modify aircraft once fielded. JPATS used FAA certification to qualify the design
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that was then modified to meet a military mission. The only value in using FAA
certification is to take advantage of the FAA’s existing codified process to approve
airworthiness for commercial derivative aircraft. This saves the Department of Defense
(DoD) the time and expense of preparing and executing their own airworthiness
certification plan. DoD just accepts the FAA certification process in its entirety and only
performs additional testing on those aspects of operation unique to the military mission.
Once aircraft are delivered, they are no longer maintained to FAA standards. Instead,
they use USAF Technical Orders and USN Technical Directives to perform all
maintenance and repair actions. Unless the FAA certified aircraft delivered to the US
military are ever planned to be resold into the commercial marketplace after their useful
military life is expended, maintaining FAA airworthiness certification has no intrinsic
value. JPATS aircraft were never planned to enter commercial service after their 24-year
useful life. If anything, they would undergo Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) to
allow continued use of the airframe beyond its original design life, and, in that case, the
aircraft would be totally under a military certification plan with no FAA involvement
whatsoever.
Military certification may be the better way to proceed from an airworthiness
standpoint it but does exonerate the OEM from liability for any non-standard
configuration features of the aircraft that the US military deems necessary.
5.4.3 Could the JPATS CFIS interim solution been military certified?
Yes, but the time constraint of the interim solution forced a decision to remain
with the OEM and its supplier who have the best understanding of the flash module.
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For the long-term solution, there are still options to compete the effort among US military
laboratories who could entirely manage the project to ensure military needs are met while
completing the project faster and at lower cost than the OEM.
5.5

Alternative Approaches to Mitigate Risk & Avoid the JPATS CFIS Situation
During program development, flash module CFIS should have been treated as a

Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). “JCTDs typically have one of
three outcomes: 1) enter into formal acquisition as a new program; 2) integrate with an
existing program; 3) return to technology development. A JCTD becomes a candidate for
transition following a successful military utility assessment.” (AFI-63, 2009:74) The
flash module CFIS design should not have been fully developed further until all aspects
of obsolescence were addressed. The most puzzling aspect is an unproven design
concept was allowed to enter into the largest aircraft fleets for both services. This laser
technology would have been better suited for introduction into a smaller fleet where it
could have less logistical impact if it did not prove reliable. “JCTDs are intended to
exploit mature and maturing technologies to solve important military problems and to
concurrently develop the associated CONOPS to permit the technologies to be fully
exploited. (AFI-63, 2009:74)” The only plausible explanation for incorporating flash
module CFIS is the JPATS mandate for commerciality per FAR Part 12 commercial
contract, which limited the normal level of technical scrutiny that would have occurred
on more traditional FAR 15 type military procurements. As such, there was an
acceptance of the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) reliability predictions
without a formal military assessment. These initial predictions have been shown to be
inaccurate with parts change outs average 18-24 months versus a 4-year baseline standard
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for similar ejection seat components, achieving only 38-50% of predicted life. In the
case of the JPATS, the CFIS flash lamp technology should have been returned for future
development.
Since JPATS CFIS flash-module design was pursued at project inception, then
once the flash lamp DMS/MS concern was discovered, an incentivization program with
the OEM & suppliers could expedite implementing a solution. The issue with the current
incentives available with a typical Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECP) seen in
Value Engineering examples is that the JPATS OEM lacks sufficient engineering staff to
adequately prepare and execute a VECP even with the potential to share in any cost
savings resulting from the effort. The OEM is better off from a profit view to respond to
a Request for Proposal, charge the US government for the bid & preparations cost, and
then execute the development plan and procurement all at either a firm fixed price or
cost-plus basis. There is no risk involved in this scenario. In the VECP example, unless
significant savings are realized, the OEM does not receive their 50% of the savings,
despite their efforts to voluntarily propose the VECP. Under the VECP, the OEM
expends their own time and funds under the expectation that the rewards will be shared.
With an ECP, there is no risk that the rewards won’t justify the effort to offer a VECP,
since all expenditures are paid for by the US government.
5.6

Summary
As more and more commodity-type items are being produced by foreign suppliers

whose lower labor costs create a market where they are the only viable producer who can
supply the item and still make a profit, the US government will reach a point where there
may be no US supply available for commodity items like the flash bulbs that formed the
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basis for this thesis. Existing laws require that US defense acquisitions to be sourced
from domestic sources or from nations whose domestic stability and amicable
relationship with the US provide reasonable assurances of continued supply in the event
of international political unrest. But with the prospect of a shrinking global supply base,
other alternatives should be explored to ensure continue access to the technology required
to maintain our level of national defense preparedness. These options include:
5.6.1 Relaxation of current statutory restrictions
This would allow a broader base of supply to produce scarce items, thereby
reducing risk of interruption if one supplier fails to produce. The advantage is that no
one source can produce a stranglehold on the supply chain. The disadvantage is that this
approach does not address the potential pitfalls of trusting that foreign parts installed in
mission critical US defense systems will perform as specified and not produce adverse
secondary effects.
5.6.3

Stockpiling critical commodities to safeguard against shortages
Although this is an absolute assurance that shortages will not occur in the short

term, providing the forecasted demand was estimated accurately, this mitigation method
is not an ideal solution. Stockpiling does not address the underlying issue of a reliable
source that can respond to a demand-pull signal and transfers the wasteful inventory
holding costs to the end user.
5.6.4 Revitalizing domestic markets by providing economic stimulus
This approach would attempt to correct the negative return on investment that
caused domestic sources to stop producing. This would require laws to be revised to
ensure that US suppliers the same opportunity as foreign suppliers.
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5.6.5

Invest in US industrial infrastructure
This would require the US government and industry to partner together to identify

critical industries where there has been significant erosion of key industrial capabilities
which threaten our ability to self-produce items and maintain vital capacity to field
defense systems solely from domestic sources. The loss of capacity over the past 25
years has created a growing dependence upon foreign suppliers for key products and has
relinquished our ability to be self-sustaining. While the world is and always will be an
interconnected global marketplace with US inextricably woven into that fabric, a
distinction still must be made to ensure that key vital production capacity to safeguard
our national interests is not lost in the euphoria of globalization.
5.7 Recommendations for Implementation
5.7.1 JPATS Procurement Should Avoid Purely Commercial Derivative
JPATS was a commercial derivative aircraft based on the Pilatus PC-9, and was
designed to take full advantage of existing technology to produce the lowest cost article
and the greatest value for the US military. However, many of the expected benefits were
not realized once JPATS was operationally deployed, when the strain of constant usage in
a military training environment started degrading system availability and subsequently
required significant upgrades to correct a lack of robustness in key systems. In
retrospect, the JPATS mission was not as ideally suited for a commercial derivative
application as originally thought. Although some durability and structural life testing
was conducted during design development to model the expected military operating
environment, either the assumptions used were not as accurate as needed or there were
unexpected factors at play that were not modeled and only discovered after the system
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was deployed, both of which drove a succession of design upgrades within a few years of
system deployment. To be fair, design improvements are a natural fall-out of operational
usage for any designed system, but in the case of a commercial-derivative platform, there
is no ability to begin the design process with a clean slate of requirements and then build
a system based around those needs. As such, much of the basic design must be accepted
in its current form based on the estimation that it will meet specific requirements. This
raises the chances that more frequent and extensive design modifications will be required
sooner over the life of a commercially-derived aircraft than one designed from its original
concept for a particular mission. An excellent example of this is the canopy fracturing
initiation system. The CFIS was expected to never require replacement and only periodic
removal of expendable life-limited components easily changed in the field. The CFIS’s
lack of reliability which is causing an unexpectedly high maintenance burden has now
forced its entire replacement to avoid unacceptably high operational costs over the life of
the platform.
5.7.2 Formalized DMS/MS Program
Although JPATS had a formal program to anticipate diminishing sources and
obsolescence, it was not able to see the CFIS DMS/MS problem looming on the horizon.
There was no periodic review of the OEM’s vendors as part of the JPATS contract, which
meant self-reporting by the sub-tier suppliers was the only mechanism to identify
DMS/MS concerns.

In addition, because obsolescence resolution was the US

government’s responsibility to fund, there was no incentive for the OEM to monitor its
sub vendors closely or aggressively pursue obsolescence avoidance. In fact, supply chain
management shortfalls have been documented within the JPATS program since the first
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aircraft deliveries began.
5.7.3

Introduction of Leading Edge Technology
JPATS provides a vivid example of the risk of introducing new technology into a

large aircraft production run (JPATS platform is largest single aircraft in both USAF and
USN fleets). Consequences of failure in achieving reliability predictions are magnified
due to the fleet size. Without a pedigree to vouch for its robustness under actual field
conditions, new technology should be reserved for small scale experimental purposes
until vetted properly through operational experience and solid reliability data.
5.7.4

Value Engineering
Value engineering is a valuable tool that should be employed whenever pursuing

alternatives for replacing components when necessitated by either loss of supplier base or
technological obsolescence. In the case of the JPATS long-term solution, VE provided
the insight to decompose required functions and performance, which were then compared
with canopy fracturing systems currently in use to assess applicability. That led to
incorporation of those features into the long-term solution which increased CFIS
reliability, reduced operating cost and recouped the investment within an acceptable
timeframe. The end result was a more robust platform with a pedigree. Value
Engineering was used in conjunction with the DMS/MS risk strategy to solve a potential
production line stoppage and sustainment breakdown that would have ceased deliveries
and grounded aircraft due to a lack of spares. The use of VE allows the DoD to spread
non-recurring engineering costs over time, making them far easier to fund. (Mandelbaum
et al, 2008:115-139). Original Equipment Manufacturers should be incentivized in their
contracts to employ Value Engineering principles in their design strategy to reduce cost
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and share in the rewards from savings realized.
5.7.5

Analytical Modeling to Assist in Decision Making
Although all modeling carries a level of uncertainty due to the assumptions and

constraints that must be made to obtain a feasible solution, properly constructed models
can provide program management with reasonable approximations of the probability of
success and identify areas of risk that must either be considered before major decisions
are made that commit significant funds. The model must also have the ability to conduct
rudimentary sensitivity analysis, which accommodates shifting priorities in response to
either unexpected operating environment changes or inaccuracies in the initial modeling
assumptions. Linear modeling using commercially available software is sufficient for the
level of accuracy required to advise on leadership on recommended courses of action.
5.7.6 Funding Allocation Revision
With the current severe fiscal constraints now gripping the nation and the need to
maximum efficiency to deliver ever-greater returns on investment, action is needed to
correct the toll that current funding poses in the Defense Department procurement
process. If adequate supplies of resources and timely delivery of product to meet mission
needs are the true goals, then the present politicizing of funding must be kept to a
minimum. Once decisions are made to pursue the development of an effort such as the
CFIS replacement, there should be no revision of that plan unless the results clearly
indicate unacceptable execution. Otherwise, the OEMs that provide the hardware to
fulfill the mission are left without assurances that their capital investment is worth the
effort and the dwindling supply base will continue to decrease until a critical mass of
capability cannot be maintained without drastic infusion of funds. That would be an
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expensive reactionary action and one that can be avoided if proper due diligence is
applied upon inception of programs, including an assurance that funding is protected
from involuntary reallocation from the onset. Otherwise, the US government will be
saddled with expensive legacy systems like the current JPATS CFIS that will be
increasingly expensive to maintain as other components begin to degrade over time as the
aircraft fleet ages.
5.8 Epilogue
As is the case with all real-time events, some of the initial conditions for this
thesis have changed as a result of marketplace interventions unanticipated at the time of
its conception. Although the validity of the investigative approach remains sound and the
lessons learned can be universally applied to similar situations, it is worth noting the
changes and how they would change some of the investigative approaches.
5.8.1 Windfall of legacy flash bulbs
In April 2011, a previously unknown source of supply was discovered and the
OEM was able to procure an additional 28,000 legacy flash bulbs that had been collecting
dust in a warehouse. The viability of these flash bulbs remains to be proven with lot
sampling and testing, but it is expected that the yield of flight-worthy items from this
cache will be approximately 60%, or 1,680 additional bulbs. Since there are 40 legacy
bulbs per aircraft, the additional bulbs will service an additional 42 aircraft. And since
25% of the fleet of 747 aircraft, or 187, requires flash bulb change out each year, when
the legacy bulbs reach the end of their useful life, the extra bulbs will only represent
42/187, or approximately three months’ worth of bulb change out. This means the
windfall will provide a relatively insignificant amount of additional capacity to the
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maintainers and therefore will not affect the overall plan to replace the legacy bulbs with
interim annular flash modules when they become available.
The original hope of the program office was to reduce the number of interim
bulbs originally planned or perhaps eliminate the need to procure any interim bulbs if the
additional bulbs could bridge the gap until the long-term solution was available to install
in the fleet. But this was not the case with the stash discovered, and as a result the extra
margin of safety stock provided by the cache proved insufficient to justify altering the
original procurement plan.
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Glossary
ACTD

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator – A demonstration effort
where a new technology is demonstrated in a real-time operation to assess
whether a maturing advanced technology(s) is ready to deliver a
significant new military capability. The results of an ACTD may lead to
eventual full-scale development or may simply end at the conclusion of
the demonstration if the technology if there is insufficient justification to
continue further development.

CAD

Cartridge Actuated Device – a small explosive device used to activate
explosive systems and initiate aircrew escape devices.

CFIS

Canopy Fracturing Initiation System – the subsystem which initiates
aircraft canopy fracturing to provide a clear path for either ejection seat
travel out of the cockpit during airborne ejection or aircrew egress in the
event of a ground emergency.

CONOPS

Concept of Operations – is a document which describes the characteristics
of a system’s intended function or operation.

DMS/MS

Diminishing Manufacturing Sources/Material Shortages – the
progressively diminishing number of suppliers and/or materials to produce
the defense systems deemed necessary to fulfill the missions of the DoD.
DMS/MS is driven by forces in the marketplace that make it either
unprofitable for a supplier to either produce an end item or procure the
raw material to manufacture the item.
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GAO

Government Accountability Office - The office within the U.S. Congress
which investigates the performance of the federal government by
evaluating the use of public funds and providing analytical, investigative
and legal services to support to Congress in its policy formulation and
decision making. Prior to 2004, GAO was known as the General
Accounting Office.

INTi

Interim Solution – the short-term solution that will provide continuing
service for the T-6 aircraft canopy fracturing system until the long-term
replacement system can be developed, qualified and deployed.

IR&D

Internal Research & Development – an effort undertaken usually within a
private sector organization using corporate funds with the intent to
produce a marketable product that will be offered to existing or new
customers. Often, IR&D is conducted within the military hardware
industry by suppliers who recognize that their existing product line
requires enhancements to remain viable with their competition’s offerings.

JPATS

Joint Primary Aircraft Training System – consists of the aircraft,
simulators (ground-based training devices), and information management
system to record and maintain training records. JPATS is also referred to
as the T-6 Texan II aircraft, currently procured by the USAF and USN in
both T-6A (USAF) and T-6A& T-6B (USN) variants.

Li

The legacy T-6 aircraft production configuration flash lamp assembly
currently installed in the JPATS fleet that initiates canopy fracturing. It
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will be replaced in the short-term with the interim solution which in turn
will be eventually replaced by the final Long-Term design solution.
LTSi

Long-Term Solution – the final design solution that will replace the
current T-6 aircraft canopy fracturing system with a more robust design to
eliminate the current DMS/MS situation impacting operational readiness.

MTBF

Mean Time Between Failure – the average service life of a part operating
in its intended environment.

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration – the agency created by
the National Aeronautics and Space Act on July 29, 1958, replacing its
predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA).
NASA’s mission is to "pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific
discovery and aeronautics research."

OEM

Original Equipment Manufacturer – the primary supplier for a hardware
end item or product, also known as the prime contractor. The OEM has
typically developed, tested and qualified an item and holds patents
protecting the proprietary nature of its investment from infringement by its
competitors.

OTS

Off-the Shelf – hardware produced from readily available technology that
is typically not patent-protected and which has often been certified for use
in its intended environment using universally accepted standards.

SLEP

Service Life Extension Program – a program which seeks to allow a
system to remain in operation beyond its originally intended retirement
date. As part of SLEP, an assessment of the current hardware is
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conducted at the end of the initially planned service life to identify
additional rework or modification that must be performed on a system to
allow continued service.
VE

Value Engineering - an organized approach to providing the necessary
functions at the lowest cost by identifying and eliminating unnecessary
elements that increase cost. It was conceived from the work of Lawrence
D. Miles, a purchasing engineer for General Electric, during the 1940s.

VECP

Value Engineering Change Proposal - a proposal submitted by a contractor
that, through a change in the contract, would lower the project's life-cycle
cost to DoD with a share in the attendant savings going to the contractor
making the VECP proposal.
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